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Management Turnaround Initiatives and Auditors’ Going-Concern Judgment: 






This study experimentally investigates how management turnaround initiatives influence 
auditor going-concern decisions involving a financially distressed firm. Prior archival going-
concern research (e.g., Behn, Kaplan & Krumwiede, 2001) indicates that operating turnaround 
initiatives taken by a financially troubled firm (e.g., cost-cutting) have a negative impact on 
auditors’  going-concern  judgments,  whereas  strategic  initiatives  (e.g.,  new  cooperative 
agreements with other firms) have a positive influence on auditors’ going-concern judgments 
(Bruynseels & Willekens, 2008). We add to this research by examining the mechanisms through 
which turnaround initiatives affect auditors’ assessment of client viability. In particular, we study 
whether this type of information has a direct impact on going-concern judgment or whether it 
affects judgment indirectly through the subsequent processing of financial evidence. In addition, 
we  investigate  whether  management  turnaround  initiatives  have  a  differential  influence  on 
going-concern judgment for experienced and novice auditors.   
The  results  of  our  experiment  reveal  a  positive  direct  effect  of  strategic  turnaround 
initiatives on going-concern judgment, but no significant direct influence of operating turnaround 
initiatives. Our analyses of the indirect effects show that the implementation of both types of 
management turnaround initiatives leads to increased recall of negative financial cues, but only 
for experienced auditors.  This further suggests that management initiatives, regardless of their 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Evaluating whether a client is a going concern is a complex judgment, especially if there 
are indications that the company is in financial distress.  When a company experiences results 
that threaten its existence, auditing standards (SAS no. 59 and ISA 570) require an auditor to 
consider  company  plans  to  mitigate  the  adverse  conditions,  including  operating  or  strategic 
actions taken by management.  The increasing use of business risk audit methods may influence 
the manner in which turnaround initiatives are  evaluated by  an auditor since they cause the 
auditor to focus on strategic performance as part of audit planning (Bell, Marrs, Solomon & 
Thomas,  1997;  Lemon,  Tatum  &  Turley,  2000;  Bell,  Peecher  &  Solomon,  2005;  Knechel, 
Salterio & Ballou, 2007).  Prior archival research has shown that client operating and strategic 
actions to address financial distress may have diverse effects on an auditor’s decision to issue a 
going  concern  opinion  (Behn,  Kaplan  &  Krumwiede,  2001;  Geiger  &  Rama,  2003;  and 
Bruynseels & Willekens, 2008).  More specifically, operating initiatives which focus on internal 
firm problems (e.g., cost cutting) have been found to increase the likelihood of receiving a going-
concern opinion. In contrast, initiatives that focus on external problems and are likely to generate 
near-term cash flows (e.g., new cooperative agreements with other firms) decrease the likelihood 
of receiving a going-concern opinion.   
This study experimentally investigates how management turnaround initiatives influence 
auditor  going-concern  decisions  involving  a  financially  distressed  firm.    We  argue  that 
knowledge of client activities to mitigate financial distress can influence auditors’ going-concern 
judgments both directly and indirectly.  A direct effect occurs because the implementation of  
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management  turnaround  actions  will  cause  the  auditor’s  assessment  of  the  likelihood  of 
bankruptcy  to  change.    An  indirect  effect  occurs  because  an  auditor’s  understanding  of 
management actions may influence the evaluation of subsequent financial information.  This 
latter effect is consistent with prior studies which have documented that an auditor’s evaluation 
of subsequent evidence is affected by the obtained holistic perspective through the assessment of 
a client’s strategic performance. For example, Ballou, Earley and Rich (2004) suggest that the 
auditor’s evaluation of a client’s strategic positioning affects the processing of information at the 
business  process  level,  while  O’Donnell  and  Schultz  (2005)  demonstrate  that  strategic 
performance affects auditors’ tolerance for inconsistent fluctuations in accounts, which in turn 
influences their account-level risk assessments.  Furthermore, Salterio, Knechel and Kotchetova 
(2006) indicate that strategic analysis influences how auditors interpret performance measures, a 
common input to the going concern judgment of auditors.   
In  this  study,  we  also  investigate  the  influence  of  audit  experience  on  auditors’ 
consideration  of  client  operating  and  strategic  initiatives  to  mitigate  adverse  conditions.  In 
particular, we propose that auditor experience moderates both the direct and indirect effect of 
turnaround information on going-concern judgment. Prior research indicates that information 
acquisition by inexperienced auditors is driven by the need to complete a task, while experienced 
auditors try to develop a thorough understanding of the client, the nature of its business and 
critical risks facing the organization (Biggs, Mock & Watkins, 1988; Biggs, Selfridge & Krupka, 
1993). This suggests that the direct effect of turnaround initiatives on going-concern judgment 
might be more pervasive for experienced auditors. Furthermore, we propose that the evaluation 
of client turnaround initiatives has differential consequences for the initial impression formation 
of the client for experienced and novice auditors. Because this initial impression of the client is  
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likely to influence the processing of subsequent client information, we expect the indirect effect 
of  turnaround  initiatives  on  going-concern  judgment  to  be  different  for  experienced  and 
inexperienced auditors.  
We conducted an experiment in which 97 experienced and novice auditors worked on a 
case  involving  a  going-concern  decision.  The  participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  six 
experimental conditions created by crossing three levels of turnaround initiatives (Operating, 
Strategic, Control) with two levels of experience (Novice, Experienced).  Our  results  show  that 
strategic initiatives have a positive direct effect on the auditors’ viability judgment, whereas 
operating initiatives have no direct effect on judgment.  Using recall as a proxy for attention, we 
also observed an indirect effect for experienced auditors who recalled more negative evidence 
cues when presented with information about either operating or strategic initiatives.  Novices 
exhibit  no  significant  indirect  effects.    These  results  suggest  that  management  turnaround 
initiatives may serve as an “early warning signal” of client distress for experienced auditors 
which causes them to focus more on financial distress indicators in subsequent analysis.  Taken 
together, the results for experienced auditors are particularly interesting because we find that 
both  types  of  client  initiatives  result  in  the  recall  of  more  negative  financial  evidence  but 
experienced  auditors  still  rate  the  chance  of  survival  significantly  higher  when  a  client 
undertakes a strategic initiative in spite of the focus on negative financial cues.  This, indeed, 
suggests a very deep level of analysis among the experienced auditors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research 
framework used in this study and develops the hypotheses to be tested.  In Section 3 we describe 
the research method.  Section 4 presents the results of the experiment.  Finally, in Section 5, we 
summarize the results and discuss the implications for auditing practice and further research.  
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II.  RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Auditing standards (SAS No. 59 and IAS 570) require an auditor to evaluate conditions 
or events discovered during the engagement that raise questions about a company’s financial 
health and ability to continue as a going concern.  When an auditor initially concludes that there 
is substantial doubt about the continued existence of the entity as a going-concern, the auditor 
should identify and evaluate management’s turnaround initiatives. However, the standards do not 
prescribe the performance of separate audit procedures solely to identify potential going-concern 
problems, i.e., the results of auditing procedures designed and performed to achieve other audit 
objectives should be sufficient for that purpose.  This is consistent with Asare (1992), who notes 
that  the  going-concern  task  is  performed  contemporaneously  with  other  tasks.    Given  the 
complexity  and  difficulty  of  the  going-concern  judgment,  Rau  and  Moser  (1999)  argue  that 
going-concern  decisions  are  generally  memory-based,  i.e.,  auditors  store  going-concern 
information in long-term memory for subsequent retrieval.  This is consistent with prior research 
which measured participants’ evaluation of going-concern evidence using cue recalls (e.g., Choo 
& Trotman, 1991; Tan, 1995; Rau & Moser, 1999; Hoffman, Joe & Moser, 2003).   
In  this  paper,  we  examine  how  auditors  process  information  about  client  initiatives 
designed to mitigate financial distress and how this influences their evaluation and memory for 
subsequent financial going-concern evidence.  The structure of the experiment used in this study 
is summarized in Figure 1. We first investigate the overall effect of turnaround initiatives on 
going-concern  judgment  and  consider  the  moderating  effect  of  experience  on  auditors’ 
consideration of client strategic and operating initiatives. In the second stage of the analysis, we 
decompose  the  overall  effect  into  a  direct  effect  of  turnaround  initiatives  on  going  concern 
judgments as well as an indirect effect as manifested in the recall of evidence cues. In addition,  
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we  argue  that  the  strength  of  both  the  direct  and  indirect  effect  of  management  turnaround 
initiatives is conditional on an auditor’s level of experience. 
Because prior research indicates that operating and strategic turnaround initiatives have a 
differential impact on auditors’ going-concern decision, our research design incorporates two 
possible client initiatives: (1) implementation of a cost-cutting initiative that saves cash in the 
short term (Operating) and (2) negotiation of an alliance with another firm that has the effect of 
improving  short-term  cash  flows  (Strategic).    In  order  to  assess  the  net  effect  of  different 
strategic initiatives, we compare auditor judgments in the Operating and Strategic conditions to a 
Control  condition  where  participants  received  no  information  regarding  current  operating  or 
strategic initiatives.  The direct effect is depicted by path A, whereas path B and C reflect the 
indirect effect, i.e. the impact of turnaround initiatives on the evaluation of financial  going-
concern evidence, measured through recall of financial information items.  
<<<<<   Insert Figure 1 about here   >>>>> 
Path A: Direct Effect of Turnaround Initiatives on Going-Concern Judgments 
SAS no. 59 and ISA 570 explicitly require auditors to consider non-financial matters and 
mitigating management plans when making a going-concern decision. Moreover, the standards 
give examples of operating (e.g., cost-cutting initiatives) and strategic factors (e.g., loss of a key 
franchise  or  license)  that  are  potentially  useful  as  going-concern  evidence.  Thus,  we  expect 
auditors to take into account the mitigating or aggravating impact of management operating and 
strategic initiatives on client viability when making a going-concern decision.   
Research  in  strategy  suggests  that  operating  and  strategic  initiatives  have  different 
implications for the potential success of a turnaround plan.  Prior research that has focused on the 
efficacy of operating initiatives such as retrenchment has yielded mixed results.  Some studies  
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report  that  retrenchment  activities  (e.g.,  cost-cutting)  contribute  to  turnaround  success  (e.g., 
Robbins  &  Pearce,  1992),  while  other  studies  cast  doubt  on  the  likely  success  of  operating 
approaches for coping with financial distress (Barker & Mone, 1994; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001).  
The mixed evidence from the strategy literature indicates that operating turnaround initiatives 
per se may be inadequate, given that a severely distressed firm’s problems often relate to its 
strategic orientation (Barker & Duhaime, 1997).  Given the evidence reported in the strategic 
literature, it is likely that auditors perceive short-term operating turnaround strategies such as 
cost-cutting as insufficient to induce recovery for distressed firms: 
H1a: For financially distressed companies, the implementation of short-term operating 
turnaround  initiatives  has  a  negative  direct  effect  on  an  auditor’s  going-concern 
judgment. 
 
External  strategic  actions  to  cope  with  poor  performance  may  be  more  difficult  to 
implement but may also have a greater chance of success.  Prior research has documented that 
strategic initiatives are more likely to lead to successful company turnaround.  For example, 
Barker and Duhaime (1997) show that when a company’s decline is due to firm-specific factors, 
recovering firms implement more extensive strategic changes.  In addition, Sudarsanam and Lai 
(2001)  indicate  that  firms  recovering  from  financial  distress  typically  adopt  more  forward-
looking, expansionary and external market focused strategies than non-recovery firms.  Given 
the  evidence  from  the  strategy  literature  about  the  effectiveness  of  strategic  approaches  for 
company turnaround and recovery, it is reasonable to expect that such strategies may have a 
mitigating impact on the auditor’s going-concern opinion.
1  
H1b:  For  financially  distressed  companies,  the  implementation  of  short-term  strategic 
turnaround initiatives has a positive direct effect on an auditor’s going-concern judgment. 
                                                 
1 As the auditor’s going-concern opinion is an assessment of the client’s ability to survive during the next 12 
months, only those (long-term) strategic approaches that are expected to have a positive impact on the company’s 
liquidity status within the next 12 months will be perceived as mitigating factors.  
  9 
 
The moderating influence of experience on going-concern judgment 
Prior empirical auditing expertise research has indicated significant differences between 
experienced and inexperienced auditors with respect to knowledge, problem solving behavior 
and decision quality (Frederick & Libby, 1986; Bonner, 1990; Bonner & Lewis, 1990; Libby & 
Frederick, 1990; Frederick, 1991; Choo & Trotman, 1991; Tubbs, 1992; Bédard & Chi, 1993; 
Davis,  1996  and  Shelton,  1999).    The  results  of  a  study  by  Biggs  et  al.  (1988)  regarding 
analytical review indicate that there is a difference between managers and seniors in terms of 
their goals in acquiring information.  For seniors, information acquisition is usually oriented 
towards obtaining the information needed to perform an assigned task. While this goal is also 
important to managers, much of their information acquisition activity is directed at developing a 
thorough understanding of the client, the nature of its business, and its most critical business 
risks.    More  specifically,  Biggs  et  al.  (1993)  find  that  the  going  concern  judgments  of 
experienced  auditors  are  influenced  by  their  extensive  knowledge  of  a  client’s  operations, 
industry, and world events.  
Moreover, prior research on the effect of auditor experience on going-concern judgment 
indicates  that  the  well-developed  knowledge  structures  of  experienced  auditors  help  them  to 
consider not only information that is typical for a company with going-concern problems, but 
also information that is atypical, such as mitigating going-concern evidence (Choo & Trotman, 
1991; Hoffman et al., 2003).  Experts are believed to organize knowledge so as to allow greater 
processing of relevant information. This increased processing capacity allows experts to better 
attend to atypical information that requires additional processing (Fiske, Kinder & Larter, 1983).  
In the same line of reasoning, Hoffman et al. (2003) argue that as repeated performance of the 
going-concern  judgment  leads  to  the  routinization  of  certain  aspects  of  the  task  (i.e.  the  
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evaluation of financial information), more processing capacity will be free for performing the 
more  cognitively  demanding  parts  of  the  task  (i.e.  attending  to  and  integrating  nonfinancial 
mitigating information)
2. In sum, this evidence suggests that an increased level of experience is 
predicted to have an increasing effect on auditors’ search and processing of information related 
to client turnaround initiatives:  
H2:  Client turnaround initiatives (operating or strategic) will have a greater direct effect 
on going-concern decision-making for experienced auditors than novices. 
 
Path B: Effect of Turnaround Initiatives on Recall of Financial Evidence  
There exists ample evidence that auditors’ expectations and beliefs have a strong impact 
on their subsequent processing of consistent and inconsistent evidence (Ashton & Ashton, 1988; 
Tubbs & Messier, 1990; Bedard & Biggs, 1991; Church, 1991; Asare, 1992; McMillan & White, 
1993  Tan,  1995  and  Wilks,  2002).    Therefore,  information  about  a  client’s  strategic  and 
operating decisions might also have an indirect influence on auditor judgments since knowledge 
of a client’s turnaround initiatives is likely to influence how an auditor subsequently interprets 
and recalls other client information (Bell et al., 1997; Knechel et al., 2007).  More specifically, 
initial information about a client’s strategic positioning and overall performance may affect an 
auditor’s processing of subsequent information and memory for evidence.   
The manner in which consistent and inconsistent information is processed by decision 
makers has been studied in social psychology using schematic models of impression formation 
and encoding (e.g., Hastie, 1981; Stangor & McMillan, 1992).  In general, an important attribute 
of  schematic  modeling  is  that  individuals  process  information  that  is  consistent  with  their 
                                                 
2 A similar effect was found for benchmarking financial performance by Salterio, Knechel and Kotchetova (2006). 
Specifically,  the  presence  of  benchmarks  facilitated  more  complete  processing  of  the  information  in  a  set  of 
performance measures for a client.  
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expectations (referred to as expectancy-congruent) differently than they process information that 
is contrary to expectations (referred to as expectancy-incongruent).  A general prediction that 
follows from this distinction is that, ceteris paribus, individuals will prefer expectancy-congruent 
information  and  will  be  better  able  to  recall  such  information in  a  decision  situation.    This 
prediction follows from two basic arguments: (1) expectancy-congruent information is easier to 
assimilate because it better fits the existing schema for an information context and will be more 
readily available in memory (Alba & Hasher, 1983) and (2) expectancy-incongruent information 
will be filtered out or reinterpreted to fit existing schema (Neisser, 1976).  Thus, basic schema 
models  of  information  processing  suggest  that  auditors  would  be  more  able  to  retrieve 
expectancy-congruent  information  which  would  then  have  an  impact  on  the  judgments  they 
make about whether a client is a going concern. 
The Associative Network Model (Srull & Wyer, 1989) has extended the insights of basic 
schema modeling by providing a foundation for more specific predictions about how consistent 
and  inconsistent  information  is  used  by  decision  makers.    The  model  assumes  that  the 
memorability of information is dependent on the extent to which it is mentally elaborated by the 
decision  maker.    Information  inconsistent  with expectations  may  be well  remembered  if  the 
decision  maker  feels  the  need  to  make  sense  of  the  inconsistent  information.  In  contrast, 
expectancy-congruent  (consistent)  information  may  be  particularly  well  remembered  if  it 
supports the validity of initial expectations (Higgins & Bargh, 1987), and the decision maker is 
motivated to bolster the validity of these expectations (Srull & Wyer, 1989).   
A  critical  question  arises  as  to  what  audit  evidence  would  be  considered  to  be 
expectancy-congruent in the context of an auditor’s going concern judgment, especially when 
management has undertaken one or more turnaround initiatives in a company that is clearly  
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financially  distressed.    Previously  discussed  research  suggests  that  management  operating 
initiatives such as cost-cutting initiatives are not sufficient to trigger a company turnaround and 
may reinforce the signal that the company faces going-concern problems. Therefore, an auditor 
is likely to assume a negative impression of a financially distressed company as a going concern 
if  it  undertakes  only  operating  actions.  As  expectancy-congruent  (consistent)  information  is 
expected to be particularly well remembered if it supports the validity of the decision maker’s 
expectations (Higgins & Bargh, 1987), we expect subsequent negative financial information to 
be well remembered by the auditor. As a result, auditors will focus on negative evidence when a 
troubled company undertakes short term operating actions to stave off failure, leading to our next 
hypothesis:  
H3a: If a client implements short-term operating initiatives (as compared to no turnaround 
initiatives) auditors will recall more negative financial cues. 
 
The case of strategic turnaround initiatives is more complex.  On one hand, the mere fact 
that a client is financially distressed and needs to undertake efforts to turn the organization away 
from failure may create a negative impression in the auditor.  However, prior research suggests 
that strategic responses to financial distress are more likely to result in a successful company 
turnaround so an auditor might adopt a positive impression when a client undertakes strategic 
initiatives.  In either case, there is a potential conflict in the information signals the auditor 
receives concerning the company.  The implications of the Associative Network Model (Srull & 
Wyer 1989) may be mixed in this situation.  On the one hand, since a strategic initiative may be 
perceived as positive, an auditor might focus on expectancy-congruent information that is also 
positive (i.e., suggesting that the firm is likely to survive).  On the other hand, since the strategic 
initiative is incongruent with the underlying financial condition of the firm, the auditor may 
focus on information that is expectancy congruent with the firm’s condition (i.e., suggesting the  
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firm may fail).  However, Srull and Wyer (1989) also suggest that a decision maker may feel the 
need  to  feel  to  make  sense  of  information  that  is  inconsistent  with  an  auditor’s  general 
impressions,  so  expectancy-incongruent  information  may  be  well  remembered  regardless  of 
whether the auditor starts with a positive or negative impression.  This scenario is cognitively 
complex  and  given  the  inherent  conflict  between  expectancy-congruent  and  incongruent 
information for competing decision frames, our next hypothesis is nondirectional:  
H3b: If a client implements short-term strategic initiatives (as compared no turnaround 
initiatives), auditors will recall more financial cues (either negative or positive). 
 
The moderating influence of experience on recall of financial evidence 
Empirical  evidence  indicates  that  both  novices  and  experts  start  the  problem  solving 
process with the formation of a mental representation of the problem which subsequently guides 
the  development  of  a  problem  solving  strategy.  However,  in  contrast  to  novices,  experts’ 
categorization  and  solution  of  an  encountered  problem  is  guided  by  their  internal  schemata 
which  contain  prototypical  firm  types,  likely  characteristics,  etc.  which  are  associated  with 
certain problem situations. These schemata are typically activated by the data encountered early 
in the analysis and allow experts to perform goal-oriented information acquisition (Bouwman, 
Frishkoff & Frishkoff, 1987; Anderson, 1988). In contrast, novice decision-makers who lack 
these internal schemata are less likely to focus their attention on the information most relevant to 
the problem and will include more disjointed information items in their evaluation (Lehman & 
Norman, 2006).  
When we apply this to the setting where auditors learn early in the audit process that the 
client is implementing various turnaround initiatives, we expect that this information will trigger 
experienced  auditors’  internal  schemata  of  a  severely  distressed  client  who  potentially  faces 
going-concern problems. Consequently, experienced auditors’ information acquisition process is  
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likely to focus on specific pieces of financial information indicative of client financial distress. In 
contrast,  novice  auditors  who  lack  these  internal  schemata  are  not  expected  to  adopt  an 
information processing strategy focusing on the evaluation of financial health, but to process the 
case information in a non-goal-oriented fashion (Biggs & Mock, 1983, Bouwman, 1984).  As a 
consequence,  experienced auditors will recall more financial  evidence indicative of potential 
going-concern problems, relative to novice auditors.  
H4:  Experienced auditors will recall more negative financial evidence cues, relative to 
novice  auditors,  if  a  client  implements  (short-term  strategic  or  operating)  turnaround 
initiatives.  
 
Path C: Effect of Recall of Financial Evidence on Going-Concern Judgment  
 
In forming memory based judgments, auditors will use all information that is seemingly 
diagnostic  for  the  judgment,  but  necessarily  limited  to  the  information  that  is  accessible  in 
memory (Feldman & Lynch 1988). This explains why the factors that influence the nature of 
recalled  information  will  also  influence  the  nature  of  the  judgment  that  is  based  on  this 
information.  If  operating  and  strategic  initiatives  have  the  predicted  effect  on  cue  recall,  it 
follows logically that the cue recall will also affect the going concern rating assigned by an 
auditor.  More specifically, auditors that recall more positive financial cues will likely have a 
more positive opinion about a company’s chance of survival resulting in a higher going-concern 
rating relative to an auditor that recalls more negative financial cues.  This argument leads to our 
third hypothesis:  




                                                 
3 In this context, a positive association means that auditors who recall more positive cues will provide a higher going 
concern rating while auditors who recall more negative cues will provide a lower going concern rating.  
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III. METHOD 
Experimental Design 
To test these hypotheses, the study employs a 3 x 2 design.  The independent variables 
are management actions in response to financial distress (Operating, Strategic, Control) and the 
level of auditor experience (Novice, Experienced).  Client responses to financial distress were 
manipulated  by  providing  participants  in  the  strategic  and  operating  conditions  with  a  brief 
overview of current initiatives, reflecting either an operating or strategic turnaround approach. 
Participants in the control condition received no information with respect to current initiatives. 
Experience was manipulated as novice (students) or experienced (managers and partners). 
We observed two sets of responses by participants during the course of the experiment: 
(1) participants’ going-concern judgments and (2) evidence cues recalled. We collected recalled 
cues as a measure of participants’ attention to going-concern evidence (e.g. Choo & Trotman, 
1991; Libby & Trotman, 1993; Tan, 1995; Phillips, 1999; Rau & Moser, 1999). We measure the 
proportion of recalled negative cues (i.e., the number of recalled negative cues divided by the 
total number of positive and negative recalled cues) as a proxy for an auditor’ relative attention 
to  confirmatory  and  disconfirmatory  evidence.    The  ratio  of  negative  cues  adjusts  for  any 
differences  in  the  total  number  of  positive  and  negative  cues  recalled  across  experimental 
conditions (Hoffman et al., 2003). 
Materials and Procedures 
Case Material 
We developed a going-concern judgment case based on the 10-K filings of a financially 
distressed Canadian food retail company. The case reflected a company that was in near-distress, 
and which could be reasonably evaluated as either needing a going concern opinion or not.  The  
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case materials were designed in close collaboration with a Big 4 auditing partner, who reviewed 
the case for reality and provided pertinent advice, and was subject to extensive pilot testing.  
Case  materials  were  delivered  through  a  web-based  information  system.
4  Each  participant 
received an email containing a web address and a unique registration code. The participants were 
also provided with the opportunity to request a copy of the results of the study. 
Experimental Procedure 
The  experimental  task  consisted  of  six  parts.    Participants  were  asked  to:  (1)  read 
company  information,  (2)  complete  a  demographic  questionnaire,  (3)  make  a  going-concern 
judgment, (4) perform a recall task, (5) make a strategic viability assessment, and (6) complete a 
debriefing questionnaire.  Participants could not look ahead to subsequent parts of the case, or 
return to parts previously completed.  
In  the  first  phase  of  the  experiment,  participants  were  assigned  to  one  of  the  three 
treatment conditions (strategic, operating, control) and were asked to assume the role of the 
newly appointed auditor of a large food retail company. They were asked to read the company 
information carefully because it would be used in subsequent parts of the exercise.  The company 
information consisted of (1) company background and vision, (2) financial ratios for the previous 
and current year, (3) an unaudited balance sheet and income statement for the current year, (4) an 
audited balance sheet and income statement for the previous year, (5) actual and forecasted profit 
and cash flow, and (6) information regarding compliance with debt covenants.  In the strategic 
and  operating  conditions,  participants  received  additional  information  indicating  that  the 
company  engaged  in  strategic  alliances  with  other  companies  (strategic  condition)  or 
implemented a cost cutting plan (operating condition) in order to improve cash flow and restore 
                                                 
4 The experimental materials and case were in English.  
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earnings and sales growth.  In both conditions, the case indicated that management actions were 
expected  to  increase  net  income  by  $30  million.    See  Appendix  1  for  an  overview  of  the 
information  contained  in  the  section  “current  strategic  initiatives  and  realisations”.  The 
participants  in  the  control  condition  did  not  receive  any  information  with  respect  to  current 
strategic  initiatives.  The  responses  of  the  third  group  provide  a  baseline  against  which  the 
responses of the participants in the strategic and operating condition can be compared. 
In the second phase of the experiment, participants were asked to fill in a demographic 
questionnaire  related  to  their  auditing  background.  The  participants  were  asked  to  provide 
information with respect to their level of responsibility within the firm, the number of years of 
audit  experience,  the  number  of  food  retail  clients  audited  in  the  past  four  years,  and  their 
industry specialisation (if any).  
In the third phase of the experiment, participants judged the probability (likelihood) that 
the company would continue as a going-concern. Participants were asked to indicate the their 
assessed probability that the company would continue as a going-concern in the coming year on 
a  scale  from  0  to  100,  with  end  points  labelled  "Definitely  Will  Not  Continue  as  a  Viable 
Operation" and "Definitely Will Continue as a Viable Operation" (e.g., Asare, 1992; Rau & 
Moser,  1999;  Shelton,  1999;  Philips,  2002;  Blay,  2005).  Additionally,  the  participants  were 
asked to judge their confidence in the going-concern decision on a scale from 0 (not confident at 
all) to 100 (entirely confident). 
The fourth phase consisted of a recall task in which the participants were asked to list all 
the information they could remember about the company and the financial statements. After 
providing all recalled items, the participants were instructed to indicate for each recalled item 
whether  it  was  positive,  negative,  or  neutral  in  regard  to  company  viability.  We  asked  the  
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participants to indicate how they interpreted each cue they recalled because research by Moser 
(1992) has indicated that the participant’s interpretation of recalled information items has more 
effect on their judgments than the experimenter’s classifications. We measure subjects’ relative 
attention to negative cues as the proportion of negative cues recalled (i.e. the number of negative 
cues recalled divided by the sum of positive and negative cues recalled) and refer to this measure 
as Proportional Recall. 
In the fifth phase of the experiment, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that 
the company would be able to execute its strategy successfully on a scale from 0 (definitely will 
not be successful) to 100 (definitely will be successful). They were also asked to indicate their 
confidence in their strategic viability assessment. To make sure that the participants took notice 
of  the  strategy  of  the  company,  we  asked  them  to  describe  the  company’s  current  strategic 
initiatives.
5  
In the last phase of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a debriefing 
questionnaire which assessed their experience in making going-concern decisions and the extent 
to which they consider strategic information when assessing a company’s ability to continue as a 
going-concern.  The flow of tasks is described in Table 1. 
<<<<<   Insert Table 1 about here   >>>>> 
Subjects 
Two  groups  of  participants  participated  in  the  experiment:  experienced  auditors  and 
novice auditors.  The experienced participants were auditors at the manager/partner level and 
were recruited from Western European Big 4 auditing firms.  These participants were selected on 
the basis of discussions with audit firm partners who indicated that they would have sufficient 
                                                 
5 The responses indicated that all participants understood the strategy of the company.  
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experience in going-concern decision-making to perform the task at hand. Of the 89 auditors that 
were contacted, 56 responded to all questions and assessments (a response rate of 63%).  The 
novice participants were 54 accounting majors who had completed an auditing course at a large 
Western European university.
6 The auditing course was taken as part of the entry exams to be 
admitted in an audit traineeship with an auditing firm. Seven observations were dropped from the 
sample because the participants appeared to have misunderstood the instructions. Another six 
observations were not included because the participants’ did not list any financial evidence cues 
when asked to complete the recall task, which strongly suggests that they did not complete the 
experiment in a thorough manner. This resulted in a final sample of 50 experienced auditors and 
47 novices.  The experienced participants consisted of 19 partners and 31 managers.   
Table  2  reports  sample  descriptive  statistics  for  overall  audit  experience  and  specific 
experience making going-concern decisions for the experienced auditors. The statistics in Table 
2 indicate that the experienced auditors had 13.4 years of audit experience, and audited one retail 
client in the past four years. Furthermore, ten percent of the experienced auditors indicated that 
they specialized in the audit of retail clients. With respect to experience in making going-concern 
decisions, on average, the participants made over eleven going-concern decisions for financially 
distressed  clients  over  the  most  recent  four  years.    None  of  the  demographic  results  varied 
significantly across the treatments groups.  
<<<<<   Insert Table 2 about here   >>>>> 
Additionally, we compared the time experienced and novice auditors spent reading the 
company  information  and  making  the  going-concern  and  strategic  viability  assessments.  We 
                                                 
6 In prior research, accounting students have been used as a surrogate for novice auditors by, for example, Frederick 
and Libby (1986), Libby and Frederick (1990), Tubbs (1992), Anderson and Maletta (1994) Hoffman, Joe and 
Moser (2003) and Lehmann and Norman (2006).  
  20 
performed  t-tests  for  differences  in  means  (not  tabulated),  which  indicated  no  significant 
differences in the time spent on the different tasks between the strategic, operating and control 
condition.
7    Experienced  auditors  spent  less  time  than  novices  reading  the  general  company 
information (t = 3.07, p<0.001), the financial ratio information (t = 3.54, p<0.001), the strategic 
information  (t  =  2.68,  p<0.010)  and  the  financial  information  (t  =  5.27,  p<0.001).  This  is 
consistent with prior research,  which indicates that experienced auditors perform more  goal-
oriented,  directed  evaluations  of  evidence,  relative  to  novice  auditors  (e.g.,  Anderson,  1988; 
Bédard & Chi, 1993; Cuccia & McGill, 2000; Thibodeau, 2003). Further analysis reveals that 
experienced auditors allocated significantly more time to the assessment of the company’s ability 
to continue as a going-concern (t = 1.86, p<0.06) relative to novice auditors.  
IV.  RESULTS 
To test whether management turnaround initiatives influenced the going-concern decision 
directly, or indirectly through memory for financial evidence, we use mediation analysis (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986). Proportional recall mediates the relation between turnaround initiatives and 
the going-concern decision if (1) turnaround initiatives are associated with proportional recall, 
(2) proportional recall is associated with the going-concern judgment, and (3) after controlling 
for turnaround initiatives, the effect of turnaround initiatives on the going-concern judgment is 
reduced.    In  the  case  that  the  relationship  between  turnaround  initiatives  and  going  concern 
judgments is not significant after controlling for proportional recall, full mediation has occurred. 
However, we expect turnaround initiatives to have a direct effect on going-concern judgment in 
addition to the indirect effect through recall of financial information, which indicates partial 
                                                 
7 One exception is the reading of strategic information, which takes 0 seconds in the CONTROL condition.   
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mediation. In addition, we investigate the influence of experience on the nature of the direct and 
indirect judgment effects.  
The Total Effect of Management Turnaround Initiatives on Going-Concern Judgments 
 
To  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  effect  of  turnaround  initiatives  on  going-concern 
judgment  is  mediated  by  recall  of  financial  evidence,  we  first  analyze  the  total  effect  of 
management initiatives on going-concern judgment. Based on the findings from the archival 
literature on this topic, we expect to find that strategic initiatives reduce the likelihood that a 
going-concern opinion is issued, while operating turnaround initiatives have the opposite effect 
(see, Behn et al.; 2001; Geiger & Rama, 2003; and Bruynseels & Willekens, 2008). We assess 
the overall effect of management turnaround initiatives by performing an ANOVA with going-
concern  ratings  as  the  dependent  variable  and  turnaround  initiatives  (Strategic,  Operating, 
Control)  and  experience  (Experienced,  Novice)  as  independent  factors  (see  Table  3).  The 
ANOVA  results  indicate  no  significant  effect  of  turnaround  initiatives  on  going-concern 
judgment (F=1.87, p<0.159) for the sample as a whole,   
Since we expect a different effect for both types of turnaround initiatives relative to the 
control  condition,  we  also  estimate  a  priori  contrasts  comparing  the  strategic  and  operating 
conditions to the control condition for experienced and novice auditors separately.  The results of 
the contrast analysis indicate that the going-concern judgments in the strategic condition are 
significantly  more  positive  than  those  in  the  control  condition  (t=1.63,  p<0.053,  one-tailed).  
This result is consistent with the results from Bruynseels and Willekens (2008), who find that 
strategic initiatives with a short-term impact on cash flow generally send a positive signal to the 
auditor and hence decrease the likelihood that a going-concern opinion is issued (see also Behn 
et al., 2001; Geiger & Rama, 2003).  Conversely, we do not find evidence of any effect of  
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operating initiatives on going-concern judgment when compared to the control group (t= -0.16, 
p<0.436, one-tailed).  Further analysis reveals that novice auditors rated both the operating and 
strategic  conditions  as  higher  than  the  control  condition,  with  the  strategic  condition  being 
11.65% higher than the control group (t=1.79, p<.039, one-tail).  Experienced auditors rate the 
operating condition as negative and the strategic condition as positive.  Although neither effect is 
statistically  different  from  he  control  group,  the  difference  of  8.96%  between  the  operating 
condition and the strategic condition (not tabulated) is significant (t=-1.33, p<.093, one-tailed).    
<<<<<   Insert Table 3 about here   >>>>> 
Path B: The Effect of Management Turnaround Initiatives on Recall of Financial Evidence 
 
The indirect effect of management turnaround initiatives on going-concern judgment is 
composed of (1) the effect of management initiatives on financial cue recall and (2) the effect of 
financial cue recall on the going-concern rating.  Table 4 reports the mean proportional recall and 
going-concern  judgments  for  experienced  auditors  and  novices.    In  general,  we  see  that 
experienced auditors recalled fewer positive financial cues in both the strategic and operating 
conditions, relative to the control condition.
8  Experienced auditors also recalled more negative 
financial cues compared to novice auditors in the strategic and operating conditions.  However, 
in  the  control  condition,  experienced  auditors  recall  more  positive  cues  and  fewer  negative 
financial cues than novices.  This pattern suggests that the experienced auditors generally have a 
more positive frame for judging going concern (Asare, 1993) than novices unless a client adopts 
actions that are construed as being in response to financial distress, in which case their focus on 
evidence cues is more negative regardless of the nature of management’s initiatives.   
                                                 
8 We distinguish between financial and non-financial cues based on whether cues relate to financial ratios and 
financial company information or the company’s business and history, industry information, vision and operating 
strategy and current strategic initiatives and realisations.  
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<<<<<   Insert Table 4 about here   >>>>> 
The impact of management initiatives on proportional recall of negative going-concern 
evidence is estimated using an ANOVA model with proportional recall as the dependent variable 
and experience and management initiatives as independent factors.  The results of the ANOVA 
are presented in Table 5.  Neither experience or management initiatives are significant as a main 
effect for proportional recall of financial evidence (Panel A) but the interaction between both 
factors is significant (F=3.95, p<.023).  These results suggest that management initiatives do not 
have an influence on proportional recall for the sample as a whole, which means that we cannot 
interpret  the  planned  contrasts  to  test  H3a  and H3b  without  considering  the  interaction  effect 
between management initiatives and experience.  For novices, the proportional recall of negative 
financial cues in the control condition was not statistically different from the proportional recall 
in the operating or strategic conditions.  However, for experienced auditors, proportional recall 
of negative financial information in the operating condition was significantly higher than the 
control  condition  (p<.002,  one-tailed).    Additionally,  experienced  auditors  had  higher 
proportional recall of negative financial information in the strategic condition relative to the 
control  condition  (p<.019,  one-tailed).    These  results  support  both  H3a and  H3b  but  only  for 
experienced auditors.  Novice auditors do not have the ability to analyze the going concern issue 
at such a complex level. This further suggests that management initiatives, regardless of their 
nature,  may  have  a  negative  indirect  effect  on  the  going-concern  judgments  of  experienced 
auditors, which is consistent with H4.  
<<<<<   Insert Table 5 about here   >>>>>     
Path A and C: Effect of Management Turnaround Initiatives and Proportional Recall on 
Going-Concern Judgments 
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    We next estimate the strength of the direct and indirect effect of turnaround initiatives, as 
well as the moderating influence of experience on the direct effect by performing an ANCOVA 
with the going-concern rating as the dependent variable, management initiatives and experience 
as  independent  variables,  and  the  observed  proportional  recall  as  a  co-variate.  Mediation  is 
indicated by a significant covariate; partial mediation through recall is identified if the variable 
reflecting management initiatives remains significant after controlling for proportional recall.  In 
addition, the interaction between auditor experience and turnaround initiatives indicates whether 
experience also has a moderating influence on the direct effect.   
    The results of the ANCOVA are reported in Table 6.  Proportional recall of financial 
evidence is positive and significant (F=11.30, p<.002), which provides strong support for H5. 
Management initiatives remain marginally significant when we include experience and financial 
recall  in  the  analysis  (p<.097),  suggesting  that  turnaround  initiatives  have  a  direct  effect  on 
auditors’  going-concern  judgment.  We  test  hypothesis  H1a  and  H1b  by  estimating  a  priori 
contrasts for strategic and operating turnaround initiatives relative to the control condition. The 
results indicate that strategic turnaround initiatives have a positive direct effect on the going-
concern  decision  (t=  2.05,  p<0.022,  one-tailed),  which  is  consistent  with  H1b.  The  contrast 
analysis  also  indicates  that  operating  initiatives  have  no  direct  effect  on  the  going-concern 
decision (t= 0.30, p<.383, one-tailed), which does not support H1a.  The interaction between 
experience  and  management  initiatives  is  not  significant,  i.e.,  both  novices  and  experienced 
auditors  rate  the  going-concern  judgment  as  more  positive  when  the  company  undertakes 
strategic turnaround initiatives, although only the results for novices are statistically significant 
(t= 1.67, p<.049). This result does not support H2.   
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    The combined results of Table 3 and Table 5 indicate that the direct effect is stronger than 
the overall effect. Although the direct effect is usually less strong than the total effect when 
mediation  is  observed,  there  are  circumstances  under  which  the  strength  of  the  direct  effect 
exceeds the total effect. In particular, the total effect may be suppressed when the direct and the 
indirect effect have offsetting signs (Mac Kinnon, Krull & Lockwood, 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 
2002). In fact, the total effect may even be close to zero under such conditions. Because our 
results show opposite signs for the direct and indirect effect of strategic turnaround initiatives, 
the effect of mediation may explain the weak results obtained in Table 3 for the test of the 
overall effect of strategic initiatives on auditor judgment.  That is, it is highly likely that the 
effect  of  strategic  initiatives  on  going-concern  judgment  is  empirically  weak  due  to  this 
suppression process caused by the opposite effects observed in testing H1a and H1b vis-à-vis H3a 
and H3b.     
<<<<<   Insert Table 6 about here   >>>>>       
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we extend prior archival research that examines the relationship between 
operating  and  strategic  management  plans  and  the  auditor’s  going-concern  decision.  Recent 
studies on this topic (Behn et al., 2001; Geiger & Rama, 2003; Bruynseels & Willekens, 2008) 
indicate that actions taken by management, such as cost-cutting and strategic initiatives with a 
short-term impact, can have a significant impact on auditor going-concern decisions. We add to 
this body of research by investigating whether those management initiatives influence going-
concern  decisions  directly  or  whether  management  initiatives  affect  going-concern  judgment 
indirectly through memory for financial evidence. Moreover, we hypothesize that these direct 
and indirect effects are different for experienced and novice auditors.  
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The results of our analysis indicate that strategic management initiatives have a slight 
positive overall effect on going-concern judgments, whereas operating initiatives do not have a 
significant  influence  on  going-concern  decisions.  When  decomposing  this  overall  effect  of 
management initiatives on going-concern judgment into a direct effect and an indirect effect 
through  recall  of  financial  evidence,  we  find  a  positive  direct  effect  of  short-term  strategic 
initiatives on going-concern judgment, supporting H1b. However, contrary to H1a, we find no 
evidence  of  a  negative  direct  effect  of  operating  turnaround  initiatives  on  going-concern 
judgment  and  no  evidence  of  a  different  direct  effect  for  novice  and  experienced  auditors 
(contrary to H2). With respect to the indirect effect of management initiatives on cue recall, we 
predicted that operating initiatives would lead to more recall of negative financial cues while 
strategic initiatives would lead to more recall of either positive or negative financial cues, and 
that the focus on negative financial information would be more pronounced for experienced 
auditors.  Our analyses of the indirect effects show that the implementation of both types of 
management turnaround initiatives leads to increased recall of negative financial cues (consistent 
with H3a and H3b), but only for experienced auditors (supporting H4). This can be explained by 
the fact that the implementation of turnaround initiatives activated experienced auditors’ problem 
representation of a severely distressed firm, which caused experienced auditors to focus more on 
financial distress indicators in their subsequent analysis. This effect is not likely to occur for 
novice auditors because they generally lack a well developed problem representation of a firm 
facing going-concern problems to guide their processing of information.  Finally, there was a 
strong  positive  association  between  evidence  recall  and  the  overall  going  concern  judgment 
(consistent  with  H5).    It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  in  spite  of  being  sensitized  to  more  
  27 
negative information, experienced auditors still rated companies undertaking strategic actions as 
having a better chance of survival relative to other firms.    
  This study is subject to a number of limitations. The first limitation that applies relates to 
the number of participants (n = 97).  The small sample size of this study is largely due to the fact 
we required half of the participant group to be audit partners or managers. A second limitation is 
that we included auditing students as novice auditors. Although these students are familiar with 
the  concept  of  going-concern  decision-making,  it  is  possible  that  their relative  lack  of  audit 
experience had an impact on the results of this study.  Third, this study considers only the impact 
of cost-cutting initiatives and strategic alliances on going-concern judgment. As the results of 
previous  research  suggest  that  alternative  turnaround  initiatives  such  as  increased  marketing 
efforts or acquisitions of other companies are also likely to have a significant impact on the 
going-concern decision (Bruynseels & Willekens, 2008), it would be interesting to analyze the 
impact of a variety of turnaround initiatives on going-concern decisions.   
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FIGURE 1 
Relation between client turnaround initiatives, experience, memory for going-concern evidence and the going-
concern opinion.     
   
















PANEL B: Decomposition of the total effect of client turnaround initiatives into a direct effect and and indirect effect 
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Going-concern judgment  
Management Turnaround Initiatives 
Path B 
 Strategic  Operating  No initiatives  
 
 
Memory for financial 
going-concern evidence 
 
             Experience  
Path A 
Path C 
Going-concern judgment  
Management Turnaround Initiatives 
 Strategic  Operating  No initiatives  
 
             Experience   




Flow of tasks    
  Strategic  Operating  Control 
Phase 1 
Read company info: 
•  Business and history 
•  Industry information 
•  Vision and operating 
strategy 
•  Financial ratios 
Read company info: 
•  Business and history 
•  Industry information 
•  Vision and operating 
strategy 
•  Financial ratios 
Read company info: 
•  Business and history 
•  Industry information 
•  Vision and operating  
strategy 
•  Financial ratios 
  •  Current strategic initiatives 
and realisations  
    (strategic alliances) 
•  Current strategic initiatives 
and realisations  
     (cost-cutting) 
 
  •  Financial company 
information 
•  Financial company 
information 
•  Financial company 
information 
Phase 2  Demographic questions  Demographic questions  Demographic questions 
Phase 3  Going-concern judgment  Going-concern judgment  Going-concern judgment 
Phase 4  Recall task   Recall task  Recall task 
Phase 5  Strategic assessment  Strategic assessment  Strategic assessment 
Phase 6  Debriefing questions  Debriefing questions  Debriefing questions 
 
 
Strategic = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client strategic turnaround initiatives   
Operating = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client operating turnaround initiatives   
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TABLE 2:  
Mean (standard deviation) of measures of audit and going-concern decision-making experience for the subsample of 
experienced auditors 




















    (7.38)  (1.01)  (0.35)  (7.49) 
           
Strategic  17  15.85  0.59  0.06  9.65 
    (2.32)  (1.12)  (0.24)  (6.09) 
           
Control  18  12.19  1.50  0.11  8.39 
    (1.47)  (3.54)  (0.33)  (7.49) 
           
Total  50  13.38  0.98  0.10  11.39 
    (1.12)  (2.28)  (0.30)  (14.81) 
 
Audit experience = years of audit experience 
Retail experience = number of food retail clients audited in the last four years 
Retail specialists = dummy variable indicating whether the participant is a self-designated retail industry specialist 
Going-concern experience = number of going-concern judgments over the last four years.  
Strategic = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client strategic turnaround initiatives   
Operating = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client operating turnaround initiatives   

























Overall effect of Turnaround Initiatives and Experience on Going-Concern Judgment 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance  
                                                                                              
Source of Variation                                df             F-statistic                     P-value 
Main Effects 
      Experience         1                1.32               0.253 
      Initiatives         2                1.87               0.159   
Interaction 
     Experience*Initiatives                    2                      0.65                 0.526 
  
Panel B: Comparisons of Going-Concern Judgments 
Contrast                        Effect size              T-statistic             P-value
a 
Operating minus Control        -0.78                    -0.16                       0.436       
Strategic minus Control                   7.45             1.63                  0.053
* 
 
Experienced:             
  Operating minus Control    -5.72        -0.86                  0.196                 
  Strategic minus Control          3.26         0.51                  0.307 
Novice                 
  Operating minus Control     4.16         0.59                  0.277 




*,**,***  indicate significance at the .10, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
 
Going-concern judgment = probability that the company will continue on a scale from 0 to 100   
Initiatives = turnaround condition (Strategic, Operating, Control) 
Experience = level of experience (Novice, Experienced) 
Strategic = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client strategic turnaround initiatives   
Operating = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client operating turnaround initiatives   
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TABLE 4:  
Mean number (standard deviation) of items recalled, memory measures and  going-concern judgments 
Management 

















































    (1.67)  (1.50)  (1.71)  (0.64)  (1.59)  (0.28)  (19.50) 
Strategic  17  5.18  1.35  3.82  0.88  3.41  0.73  62.65 
    (2.83)  (1.22)  (2.65)  (0.78)  (3.40)  (0.32)  (20.01) 
Control  18  5.11  2.56  2.56  2.56  2.17  0.50  59.39 
    (2.08)  (2.45)  (1.79)  (2.45)  (1.89)  (0.38)  (19.95) 
Total  50  5.18  1.78  3.40  1.36  2.94  0.68  58.78 
    (2.22)  (1.89)  (2.16)  (1.80)  (2.04)  (0.35)  (19.77) 
 



















    (3.45)  (1.89)  (2.23)  (1.24)  (2.07)  (0.36)  (22.78) 
Strategic  17  5.41  2.06  3.35  1.18  3.12  0.70  69.41 
    (2.53)  (1.75)  (1.87)  (1.01)  (1.65)  (0.27)  (13.21) 
Control  17  4.71  1.18  3.53  0.82  3.12  0.76  57.76 
    (3.31)  (1.47)  (2.76)  (0.95)  (2.57)  (0.30)  (18.21) 
Total  47  5.19  1.83  3.36  1.06  2.94  0.71  63.13 
    (3.05)  (1.74)  (2.28)  (1.05)  (2.11)  (0.31)  (18.36) 
 
a Cue type is based on subjects’ classifications of the cues. 
 
Proportional Recall = proportion of negative cues divided by the sum of positive and negative cues recalled.  
Going-concern judgment = probability that the company will continue on a scale from 0 to 100. 
Strategic = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client strategic turnaround initiatives   
Operating = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client operating turnaround initiatives   
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TABLE 5 
Effect of Turnaround Initiatives and Experience on Proportional Recall 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance-Path B                                                             
                                                                                              
Source of Variation                                  df             F-statistic                 P-value 
Main Effects 
      Experience           1                0.10          0.757 
      Initiatives           2                1.08          0.344  
Interaction 
     Experience*Initiatives                             2                           3.95               0.023
** 
  
Panel B: Planned Comparisons-Path B 
Contrast              Hypothesis    Effect Size         T-statistic             P-value
a 
Operating minus Control      H3a                       0.11                     1.41         0.081
*       
Strategic minus Control      H3b               0.08                       1.04                0.151 
 
Experienced:             
  Operating minus Control    H4           0.34                          2.99    0.002
***                
  Strategic minus Control    H4           0.23                          2.10                0.019
** 
Novice                 
  Operating minus Control    H4          -0.11          -0.90                0.184 
  Strategic minus Control    H4             -0.07          -0.61                0.271   
 
a one-tailed 
*,**,***  indicate significance at the .10, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
 
Going-concern judgment = probability that the company will continue on a scale from 0 to 100. 
Proportional Recall = proportion of negative cues divided by the sum of positive and negative cues recalled.  
Initiatives = turnaround condition (Strategic, Operating, Control) 
Experience = level of experience (Novice, Experienced) 
Strategic = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client strategic turnaround initiatives   
Operating = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client operating turnaround initiatives   
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TABLE 6 
Effect of Turnaround Initiatives, Experience and Proportional Recall on Going-Concern Judgment 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance-Path A and C                                                             
                                                                                              
Source of Variation                        Hypothesis        df             F-statistic                 P-value 
Main Effects 
      Experience           1                1.72          0.193 
      Initiatives               2                2.39          0.097
*   
      Proportional Recall        H5     2                           10.30                        0.002
*** 
Interaction 
     Experience*Initiatives                             2                           0.05               0.952 
  
Panel B: Planned Comparisons-Path A 
Contrast              Hypothesis    Effect Size         T-statistic             P-value
a 
Operating minus Control      H1a                        1.39            0.30         0.383       
Strategic minus Control      H1b                8.97            2.05                0.022
** 
 
Experienced:             
  Operating minus Control    H2           0.65                          0.10    0.461                 
  Strategic minus Control    H2           7.58                          1.21                0.115 
Novice                 
  Operating minus Control    H2           2.13                      0.32                0.375 
  Strategic minus Control    H2            10.37                        1.67                0.049
**   
 
a one-tailed 
*,**,***  indicate significance at the .10, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
 
Proportional Recall = proportion of negative cues divided by the sum of positive and negative cues recalled.  
Initiatives = turnaround condition (Strategic, Operating, Control) 
Experience = level of experience (Novice, Experienced) 
Strategic = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client strategic turnaround initiatives   
Operating = experimental condition where participants received information with respect to client operating turnaround initiatives   
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APPENDIX 1: EXCERPTS FROM EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
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